The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis by Camerer, Colin et al.
The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
Author(s): Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, Martin Weber
Source: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 5 (Oct., 1989), pp. 1232-1254
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831894 .
Accessed: 14/02/2011 14:13
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Political Economy.
http://www.jstor.org
The Curse of Knowledge in Economic 
Settings: An Experimental Analysis 
Colin Camerer 
University of Pennsylvania 
George Loewenstein 
University of Chicago 
Martin Weber 
Institut fur Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed 
agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less- 
informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assump- 
tion that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents 
are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their 
interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing 
judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we 
find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 per- 
cent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic 
behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under un- 
certainty are discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
In many economic transactions, some agents know more than others. 
For example, sellers are better informed about the true value of their 
products than buyers; workers know more about their ability and 
motivation than prospective employers. Attempts by informed agents 
to exploit the asymmetry in information can result in market-level 
consequences. Beneficial bargains go unstruck because of adverse 
selection (Akerlof 1970), bid-ask spreads in financial markets increase 
when insiders are present (Glosten and Milgrom 1985), and wages 
can diverge from productivity when workers' characteristics are un- 
observable (Salop and Salop 1976). The conventional assumption in 
such analyses of asymmetric information is that better-informed 
agents can accurately anticipate the judgments of less-informed 
agents. We discuss a systematic judgmental bias that challenges this 
apparently noncontroversial assumption. 
In predicting the judgments of others, agents are unable to ignore 
the additional information they possess. This "curse of knowledge"' 
has two consequences: First, better-informed agents may suffer 
losses. More information can actually hurt. Second, the curse of 
knowledge can mitigate market consequences resulting from infor- 
mation asymmetry. For example, the seller of a "lemon" may lower its 
price to reflect unobservable defects, reducing the degree of market 
failure. Paradoxically, individual irrationality can enhance collective 
rationality.2 
All the previous evidence of the curse of knowledge has been gath- 
ered in psychological studies of individual judgments (see, e.g., Fisch- 
hoff 1975). But the important question for economics is whether the 
curse harms the allocation of resources in economic settings. There 
are several reasons why economists might be skeptical of the psychol- 
ogists' findings: (1) The curse may result from careless thinking by 
subjects who have no financial incentive to respond accurately. Given 
the right incentives, it could be conjectured, individuals would exert 
sufficient cognitive effort to overcome the curse. (2) In natural set- 
tings, people often receive feedback about the accuracy of their pre- 
dictions. Over time, such feedback might reduce or eliminate judg- 
mental bias. Subjects in earlier studies of the curse did not receive 
feedback and, hence, did not have an opportunity to learn from their 
mistakes. (3) Disciplining forces in markets are not present in psychol- 
ogy experiments. In markets, agents who are less subject to the curse 
of knowledge might exert disproportionate influence on prices and 
' This term was suggested by Robin Hogarth. 
2 Analogously, contributions to public goods may be individually unprofitable but 
collectively profitable (e.g., Dawes and Thaler 1988). 
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allocations, effectively reducing or eliminating market-level effects 
even if many agents are biased. 
We test arguments 1-3 by using market experiments to see 
whether financial incentives, learning from feedback, and market 
forces make the curse of knowledge disappear. We find that feedback 
alone has little effect, while market forces reduce the magnitude of 
the curse by approximately 50 percent. After describing the experi- 
ments and results, we return to the central question of how these 
judgment biases might affect economic settings. 
Our experiments are one example of empirical efforts to determine 
whether violations of normative theories of judgment and choice, 
typically found in psychological studies, tend to persist in economic 
settings (e.g., Camerer 1987). Such tests may help answer long- 
standing theoretical questions about the behavioral foundations of 
economic theory (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1985; Russell and Thaler 
1985; Hogarth and Reder 1986). 
II. Formal Representation of the Curse 
of Knowledge 
By expressing the curse of knowledge formally, we shall see that it 
violates a normative rule-the "law of iterated expectations"-much 
as choices violate the normative model of expected utility theory 
(Machina 1987; Weber and Camerer 1987) and probability judg- 
ments violate normative principles such as Bayes's rule and the con- 
junction rule (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). 
Call the random variable being forecasted X. If X is a discrete event, 
then it has the value zero or one. Forecasts of X depend on the 
information set available to the forecaster. Assume that there are two 
information sets Io and II, where Io is a subset of II. A forecaster 
with information set I, knows everything that the forecaster with in- 
formation set Io knows, and more.3 Denote the optimal forecast of X 
given the information set Io by E(X1IO). We are interested in forecasts 
of forecasts, which are useful when agents need to forecast behavior 
of other agents. An agent with information set I, who forecasts the 
forecast of an agent with information Io is estimating E[E(X1I0)1I11]. 
The law of iterated expectations states that if I, includes Io, then 
E[E(X1I0)1I1] must equal E(XIIo) (Chow and Teicher 1978, p. 204). 
Better-informed agents should ignore their additional information 
when forecasting the forecasts of less-informed agents. When the 
3 In technical treatments, I, is a finer partition of a probability space than I,); the 
additional knowledge contained in II, like the additional information given to subjects 
in our experiments, presumably enables one to make a finer partition. 
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curse of knowledge occurs, the forecaster with information I, overesti- 
mates the scope of Io. Formally, the curse of knowledge means that 
E[E(X|Io)|I1 ] is not equal to E(X|IO), but is somewhere between E(X|Io) 
and E(X|II). A simple model we test in our experiments is 
E[E(XI0)1I11] = wE(XIIi) + (1 - w)E(XIIo). (1) 
If w = 0, an agent is applying the law of iterated expectations cor- 
rectly. If w = 1, agents who know II think that all other agents know II 
too. The parameter w thus measures the degree of curse of knowl- 
edge. 
III. Experimental Design 
The market experiments consisted of two stages. In the first stage we 
collected predictions of eight actual companies' earnings from 51 
Wharton students. In the second stage, conducted 2 months after the 
first, we informed a second group of subjects of the actual earnings 
and had them trade assets that paid a liquidating dividend equal to 
the predictions of the first group. This second group knew that the 
asset dividend was determined by the first group's predictions, but 
they did not know the exact amount of the dividend. 
In the first stage, subjects were given a Value Line4 report about 
each company's prospects in 1980, along with a brief summary of the 
company's business activity, annual earnings per share from 1970 
through 1979, and quarterly earnings per share from 1977 through 
1979.5 A sample report is shown in the Appendix (fig. A2). Each 
report had a blank box in the upper right-hand corner, labeled 
"1980." Subjects were instructed to write their estimate of the com- 
pany's actual 1980 earnings in the box. 
For the sake of credibility, the companies' names were not dis- 
guised. However, no well-known companies were selected, and there 
was no evidence that any subject knew any company well enough to 
recall any details of its history other than those given in the report. 
These data were collected as a classroom exercise in a quantitative 
methods course. As an incentive for accuracy, subjects were paid 
$1.00 for each estimate that was within 10 percent of actual 1980 
earnings. 
4 Value Line issues reports used by investors to assess future earnings potential of 
companies. 
5 Most market experiments involving uncertainty rely on random probability devices 
such as bingo cages or dice. These devices are used because experimenters wish to 
control subjective probabilities as tightly as possible. Since our study is specifically 
focused on differences in subjective probability, we used natural stimuli that permit 
such differences instead of using bingo cages or dice. 
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FIG. 1.-Sequence of steps in the market experiments 
In the second stage, market experiments 1-2, the subjects were 
groups of nine Wharton students who had participated in other mar- 
ket experiments.6 Instructions were read aloud. The experiments 
consisted of eight identical markets, one for each of the eight com- 
panies. Markets were split into two periods, the A and B periods. 
The chronological sequence of steps in the market experiment is 
summarized in figure 1. At the beginning of each period, these "in- 
formed subjects" were endowed with two assets and $50 in cash, 
which had to be repaid at the end of the period (along with a $3.50 
"tax"). They could trade these assets to others7 in a double-oral auc- 
tion8 or keep them. At the end of the B period for a particular com- 
pany, subjects received a dividend for each asset they held at the end 
6 These subjects knew from their earlier experience that our experiments do not 
involve any form of deception and that all rewards would be delivered as claimed. 
Their experience with trading also reduced the noise in market behavior created by 
inexperienced subjects. 
7 Subjects could also sell assets short by "creating" assets and paying dividends for 
assets created. Short selling increases market discipline because if the curse of knowl- 
edge causes prices to be too high, unbiased traders can discipline biased traders by 
selling more units than they are endowed with. 
8 Buyers and sellers shouted out bids or offers at which they were willing to buy or 
sell. When a bid and offer matched, a trade took place; previous bids and offers 
disappeared. All bids, offers, and trades in a current period were recorded on a trans- 
parency shown on an overhead projector for subjects to see. No record of previous 
periods was posted. The A and B trading periods were each 4 minutes long. 
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of each of the A and B periods. After the dividends were paid, the 
assets expired worthless. 
The dividend amount was equal to the mean earnings prediction of 
subjects in the first stage of the experiment. In the notation used 
earlier, the value of assets was E(1980 earningslIo), where Io was the 
information given to the first group of Wharton students. Subjects in 
the market stage of the experiment saw exactly the same Value Line 
reports that subjects had seen in the first stage except that the blank box 
in the upper right-hand corner was filled in with the actual 1980 earnings. 
Therefore, the subjects in the market experiment had information II, 
which included Io9 and the actual 1980 earnings. Because the assets 
paid a dividend of E(1980 earningslIO), the subjects in the market 
experiment had to estimate E[E( 1980 earningsIo)|II ]. If these subjects 
suffer from the curse of knowledge and market forces do not erase it, 
market prices will be biased away from E(1980 earningslIO) in the di- 
rection of E(1980 earningslIl) (which is simply the 1980 earnings).10 
In addition to trading assets, market subjects also estimated the first 
group's predictions at three points: before the A period, between the 
A and B periods, and after the B period. They earned 25 cents for 
each response that was within 10 percent of the first group's mean 
prediction. 
The traders in these markets are like investment banks who under- 
write issues of corporate securities. Underwriters compete for securi- 
ties they sell to investors who know less about the true value of the 
issues than they know (because underwriters typically have access to 
detailed information beyond that included in the public prospectus). 
To price the issue correctly, underwriters must ignore the extra infor- 
mation they have. To price the assets in our experiments correctly, 
traders must anticipate the judgments of a "public" (the uninformed 
subjects) that knows less than they do. Instead of selling assets directly 
9 Of course, we cannot be certain that Io is a subset of Il because different subjects 
participated in the two parts of the experiment and the experiment was conducted 
after 1980. However, subjects were drawn from a common pool of students with homo- 
geneous education, and there was no evidence that the two groups had different 
knowledge about company earnings. 
10 The Value Line report for Diamond Shamrock, shown in the Appendix (fig. A2), 
illustrates how the curse of knowledge might operate. Diamond's earnings per share 
for 1979 were $3.37 and 1980 earnings were $3.66, up about 30 cents. The report 
states that Diamond's "acquisition of Falcon Seaboard . . . reduced 1979 earnings per 
share by about 30g. The impact should be smaller in 1980." A subject who knew that 
the 1980 earnings were $3.66 could think that uninformed subjects who read the 
report would know enough to correct the 1979 earnings of $3.37 for the temporary 30- 
cent reduction and expect 1980 earnings to be around $3.67. But the 30-cent reduction 
looms large (it is psychologically "available") only because it explains the difference 
between 1979 earnings and 1980 earnings. 
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to the public, as underwriters do, they exchange the assets for a divi- 
dend determined by the public's judgment. 
IV. Experimental Results 
First we describe the results of the market experiments. Then we 
contrast judgments that subjects made during the market experiment 
with judgments made by individuals outside of a market setting. 
Market Prices 
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the mean prices and judgments in the 
two market experiments. For each company, arrowheads show the 
mean estimate by market subjects of the first group's prediction. Ver- 
tical lines extend two standard errors around each arrowhead. Two 
plus signs indicate the mean trade price in the A and B periods. 
(Means are plotted because prices did not vary much within periods.) 
The numbers of trades in the A and B periods are shown underneath 
the figures. Notice also that the y-axis scales are different for each 
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FIG. 3.-Mean prices and judgments by company (experiment 2) 
company. Horizontal dotted lines show the prediction of the unin- 
formed group about actual earnings, E(1980 earningsllo); this is the 
no-bias prediction (w = 0 in the model [1]). Solid lines show the actual 
1980 earnings, E(1980 earningsl~l), the pure-bias (w = 1) prediction. 
Notice that the no-bias prediction is sometimes above the pure-bias 
prediction and sometimes below it, so risk aversion that lowers prices 
will not favor one prediction over another. 
Several effects are apparent in the data. Judgments and prices are 
close together, as one would expect. Prices generally begin between 
the pure-bias and no-bias predictions and move away from the pure- 
bias prediction slightly. There were an average of 12.8 trades per 
period, including 5.8 short sales. 
Equilibrium Prices 
The equilibrium price that a time series of trade prices is converging 
toward can be assessed by estimating a simple partial adjustment 
model (see Camerer 1987). Regressions show that equilibrium prices 
are between the pure-bias and no-bias predictions, as figures 2 and 3 
suggest (details are available from the authors). There is little varia- 
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tion in the time series of prices, so the estimates are extremely precise; 
standard errors are typically a penny or two. We can strongly reject 
both the no-bias (w = 0) and pure-bias (w = 1) hypotheses. 
Movements in Prices and Judgments 
By including a dummy variable for B periods in equilibrium price 
regressions, we can tell whether the degree of bias shrinks between 
periods A and B. When three companies for which bias could not be 
measured were excluded, bias was smaller in period B than in period 
A for 11 of 13 comparisons (significant at the 10 percent level in four 
comparisons) and larger in two of 13 comparisons (both significant). 
We can also ask whether the judgments that market subjects made 
about E(1980 earningsIlo)-before the A period, between the A and 
B periods, and after the B periods-differed because of their market 
experience. In 54 percent of the cases, judgments did not change at 
all or moved toward or away from both predictions. In the remaining 
131 cases, 83 (63 percent) indicated a reduction in bias and 48 (37 
percent) indicated an increase in bias. (These fractions are different 
from 50 percent at the 1 percent level.) Market experience does re- 
duce bias. 
Judgments under Incentives, Feedback, and Markets 
Markets occupy a special place in economics, but to a psychologist 
market forces are simply another "treatment variable," akin to incen- 
tives, instructions, education, and so forth. We can test the impact of 
market experience as a treatment variable by comparing the judg- 
ments made by individuals in the market experiments (market condi- 
tion) with judgments made by other subjects who were given incen- 
tives but no feedback (incentives condition, n = 19) or incentives and 
feedback (feedback condition, n = 13). 
The subjects in the incentives and feedback conditions were Uni- 
versity of Chicago MBA students. Their judgment task was the same 
as the judgment task of subjects in the market experiments: knowing 
actual 1980 earnings, they were asked to guess the mean prediction of 
the uninformed subjects who had predicted 1980 earnings previ- 
ously. They earned $1.00 if their judgment was within 10 percent of 
the actual mean prediction. In the feedback condition, subjects were 
told the actual mean prediction of the uninformed subjects after each 
guess. 
To compare degrees of bias, it is useful to convert subjects' judg- 
ments E[E(1980 earningslIO)1II] into a curse of knowledge bias index: 
E[E(1980 earningslIo)1II] - E(1980 earningslIo) 2 
E(1980 earnings|Il) - E(1980 earningslIO) (2) 
CURSE OF KNOWLEDGE 1241 
1 .0 
0.9 Market Judgments 
1/ I 
0.8 -- Individual Judgments 
(1) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I \ 
< 0.7 / 
10.6 ' 
;5 a / X. -s\ 0.4 / I I I I 
LU 
C-) 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
Diamond Great Conwood Jerrico Angelica Questor Rockcor E-System 
(t-statistic of difference: -.65 4.36 .37 1.60 1.93 .79 2.07 -.41 
40 degrees of freedom) COMPANY 
FIG. 4.-Percentage bias: market vs. individual judgment 
This index measures the parameter w in model (1). Index values 
below zero or above one are conceivable but rare. If w = 0, there is no 
bias; " if w = 1, market subjects act as if 1980 earnings were perfectly 
predictable. The index measures the distance between judgments and 
the dotted lines in figures 2 and 3, as a fraction of the distance be- 
tween the solid and dotted lines. 
There is no difference between the biases of subjects in the incen- 
tives and feedback conditions; feedback apparently did not reduce 
bias.'2 Therefore, we pool data from subjects in the incentives and 
feedback conditions. 
Figure 4 shows the mean degree of bias among subjects in the 
incentives and feedback conditions (labeled "individual judgments") 
and the mean degree of bias in judgments made after period B of the 
market experiments (labeled "marketjudgments"). The t-statistics be- 
low each company's name test whether the two mean biases are equal. 
Individuals in both conditions exhibit some positive degree of bias, 
but the market reduces bias by about half. (The reduction is signifi- 
" To be sure that uninformed subjects could guess other uninformed subjects' esti- 
mates without bias, two groups of Chicago subjects were asked to guess the uninformed 
group's mean prediction without knowing the actual 1980 earnings. One group got 
feedback (n = 14) and one group did not (n = 17). Their judgments were randomly 
distributed around the judgments of the uninformed Wharton subjects. 
12 For the eight companies, the t-statistics comparing incentive group and feedback 
group means were 1.6, -0.4, 2.9, 0.3, - 1.9, - 1.3, and 0.6 (a positive number means 
that feedback group subjects show less bias). 
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cant at 5 percent for three of eight companies.) With more than two 
trading periods per company, the market might reduce bias even 
further. 
How Does the Market Reduce Bias? 
Market experience clearly reduces bias more than individual judg- 
ment tempered by incentives and feedback. Why? A common argu- 
ment is that markets correct irrationalities because more rational trad- 
ers drive less rational traders into bankruptcy or somehow correct the 
errors of less rational traders. Since traders are unlikely to go bank- 
rupt in these experiments, the latter explanation is more natural: 
perhaps less biased subjects trade earlier or more often, thus signaling 
their information to more biased subjects. 
The process we have in mind is analogous to models of information 
aggregation in which uninformed traders can infer the information 
of insiders from their trading activity (e.g., Grossman 1981; Plott and 
Sunder 1982). In our experiments there are no true insiders because 
everyone receives the same information. However, less biased traders 
are like insiders because they are better informed about the true value 
of the assets. 
For the information aggregation analogy to apply it is essential that 
subjects have enough self-insight to know whether they are more or 
less biased than others. (If all traders think that they are the least 
biased, the most biased will trade as often as the least biased.) To 
measure self-insight, after the experiment'3 we asked subjects to pre- 
dict their ranks, relative to the other traders, in (i) trading profits and 
(ii) earnings from predicting the uninformed group's estimates accu- 
rately. Subjects earned $2.00 if their predicted rank exactly matched 
their actual rank. 
Rank-order correlations between predicted and actual ranks in the 
two experiments were (i) .99 (p < .005) and .60 (p < .04) for trading 
profits and (ii) .58 (p < .05) and .78 (p < .01) for earnings from 
judgments.'4 Since these ranks were measured after the experiment 
was over, the correlations probably represent upper bounds on self- 
insight, but they are rather large nonetheless. 
The substantial correlations indicate that less biased traders seem to 
know who they are. Were they also more aggressive? To find out, we 
can rank traders according to the degree of bias evident in their initial 
13 We asked for ranks after the experiment because doing so before trading began 
gives them an incentive to achieve their rank, possibly by trading unprofitably. 
14 The rank-order correlations between ranks in judgment profits and ranks in trad- 
ing profits were .39 and -.03 in the two experiments. Estimating the dividend accu- 
rately is apparently not a strong predictor of trading profit. 
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TABLE 1 
DEGREE OF TRADER BIAS BY ACTION NUMBERS (Positive Number = Less than 
Average Bias) 
ACTION NUMBERS 
STATISTIC 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 All 
Mean rank .43 .36 .03 .01 .30 
Median rank .90 .60 .65 .50 .25 
Percentage of positive 
ranks 55.8 59.5 54.8 57.4 55.8 
z-statistic* 1.03 1.09 .82 1.21 3.04 
NOTE.-Ranks are from - 4 (most biased) to + 4 (least biased). If least biased traders account for a disproportion- 
ate fraction of transactions, mean and median ranks will be positive. 
* The z-statistic has a unit normal distribution under the null hypothesis that the percentage of positive ranks is 50 
percent, by a normally approximated binomial test. 
judgment, made before trading began. The trader with the judgment 
farthest from the no-bias prediction was ranked -4 and the closest 
trader was ranked +4. Then we analyzed the ranks of the traders 
who took each market action-a bid, offer, or acceptance of a bid or 
offer-in the A trading periods. 
The data are summarized in table 1. The table is read as follows: 
For the first five actions (1-5), the mean rank in bias of the traders 
taking those actions was .43, the median rank was .90, and 55.8 per- 
cent of those traders had positive ranks (excluding median ranks of 
zero), indicating less bias than the median trader. Since the mean 
rank of all traders is zero, by definition, the fact that the mean rank of 
traders taking actions is positive implies that less biased (positive- 
rank) traders were taking more than their share of actions, through- 
out the experiment. 
Less biased traders know roughly who they are and act dispropor- 
tionately often, as the information aggregation account suggests, but 
the effect is small in magnitude. 
Summary of Results 
The results answer several questions: Q: To what equilibrium are 
prices converging? A: To an equilibrium between the pure-bias and 
no-bias predictions. Q: Are prices and judgments moving away from 
the pure-bias prediction more often than chance? A: Yes. We know 
this from comparing prices in A and B periods and studying changes 
in individuals' judgments between periods. Q: Do judgments made in 
markets show less bias than judgments made by individuals not sub- 
ject to market forces? A: Yes. Subjects in markets show about half as 
much bias. Q. Why do markets show less bias? A: Less biased traders 
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seem to know that they are less biased, and they take actions more 
often than more biased traders do. 
Our objective has been to test whether incentives, experience, and 
market forces reduce or eliminate the curse of knowledge. The ex- 
perimental data suggest that incentives and feedback do not reduce 
the bias, but market forces do. Of course, our subjects have less incen- 
tive and experience than professionals because they earn less money 
and train for hours, not years. But the available laboratory evidence 
suggests that very large incentives and extensive training do not im- 
prove learning much.'5 Furthermore, our subjects' incentives and 
learning experience are intense and compacted; they may learn better 
in a simple laboratory task than professionals can in a noisy natural 
environment. 
V. Implications for Economics 
There are at least two major economic situations in which the curse of 
knowledge may be important. The first is the classic case of asym- 
metric information (as discussed in the Introduction); the second oc- 
curs when agents gain information over time and then try to recall 
what they or others previously believed (hindsight bias). 
Asymmetric Information 
Often agents have private information about their characteristics 
(causing adverse selection) or actions (causing moral hazard) that less- 
informed agents lack. Most theoretical analyses of such situations 
focus on less-informed agents' attempts to learn the private informa- 
tion or create contracts that minimize efficiency losses from the infor- 
mation asymmetry. Implicit in such analyses is the assumption that 
better-informed agents can optimally exploit their informational ad- 
vantage. Our data and earlier studies (Ross, Greene, and House 1977; 
Nickerson, Baddeley, and Freeman 1987) suggest that this simulation 
is difficult; better-informed agents do not fully appreciate the infor- 
mational advantage they possess. For example, in bargaining, one 
agent may know the size of the amount being divided while the other 
does not. However, to fully exploit their advantage, they should make 
the same offer regardless of the amount to be divided (Myerson 
1986). But agents actually offer more when the amount to be divided 
is larger (Forsythe, Kennan, and Sopher 1987; cf. Banks, Camerer, 
and Porter 1988). Agents are unable to act "inscrutably"; they cannot 
ignore their better information when they should. 
15 On incentives, see, e.g., Camerer (1987). On learning, see the calibration literature 
summarized in Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982). 
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The curse of knowledge may also influence strategic behavior by 
firms. Firms often do not know how many other firms compete with 
them. Knowing the information and reasoning that motivate their 
own ventures and exaggerating the degree to which the rationale is 
shared, businesses may tend to overestimate the amount of competi- 
tion (i.e., firms act like price takers when they are not). During the 
silver bubble of the 1980s, one broker abandoned the business of 
buying coins and selling bullion and the bid-asked spread between 
coins and bullion rose dramatically. The futures-stock spread rose 
similarly when many index futures arbitrageurs left the business after 
the October 1987 stock market crash. In both of these examples, firms 
did not seem to realize how profitable spreads would be after they 
left, as if they underestimated their own influence in the market. 
Perhaps the setting closest in structure to our market experiments 
is underwriting, in which well-informed experts price goods that are 
sold to a less-informed public. Investment bankers value securities, 
experts taste wines, store buyers watch clothes being modeled, and 
theater owners see motion pictures before they are released. They 
then sell those goods to a less-informed public. If they suffer from the 
curse of knowledge, high-quality goods will be overpriced and low- 
quality goods underpriced relative to profit-maximizing values; prices 
will reflect characteristics (e.g., quality) that are unobservable to unin- 
formed buyers. 
The curse of knowledge has a paradoxical effect in these settings. 
By making better-informed agents think that their knowledge is 
shared by others, the curse helps alleviate the inefficiencies that result 
from information asymmetries, bringing outcomes closer to complete 
information (first-best) outcomes. In such settings, the curse on indi- 
viduals may actually improve social welfare. 
Hindsight 
The second economic situation in which the curse of knowledge may 
operate is when agents accumulate information over time and must 
attempt to reconstruct their earlier perspective. The analogue to the 
tendency to overestimate the knowledge of less-informed agents is a 
tendency to exaggerate what one knew before, when one was less 
informed. This has been called "hindsight bias" (Fischhoff 1975). 
When one looks backward, events seem to have been more predict- 
able than they were. For instance, public discussions of medical cases 
make doctors think that diseases were easier to diagnose than they 
actually were (Dawson et al. 1986). 
This exaggeration interferes with the evaluation of decision quality. 
Outcomes are an imperfect indicator of decision quality; good deci- 
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sions can lead to bad outcomes and vice versa. But principals must 
often judge decisions of agents on the basis of outcomes because 
actions or decision criteria are unobservable (Ross 1973; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). The curse of knowledge suggests that outcome infor- 
mation will be overused; principals will tend to think that ex ante 
optimal decisions with unfavorable outcomes were nonoptimal and 
that nonoptimal decisions with favorable outcomes were optimal 
(Baron and Hershey 1988). As a result, agents will be excessively 
penalized for negative outcomes and insufficiently rewarded for fa- 
vorable results. 
Although the principal and agent can contract today to avoid to- 
morrow's hindsight bias,'6 when contracts are implicit, hindsight bias 
will cause a principal to recall the terms of yesterday's contract incor- 
rectly (see, e.g., Fischhoff and Beyth 1975). This problem is especially 
acute in public decision making, in which the principals are a diffuse 
group of voters and contracts are rarely explicit. Hindsight bias ap- 
pears regularly in investigations of disasters (such as the Challenger 
explosion or the MOVE incident in Philadelphia). It may also lead 
judges and juries to exaggerate the culpability of defendants in liabil- 
ity litigation, leading to inflated awards. 
The curse of knowledge may also influence individual decision 
making under uncertainty. Exaggerating the predictability of events 
intensifies the regret people feel when choices yield outcomes worse 
than those that would have resulted from forgone options. Choice 
theories incorporating regret have been axiomatized (Bell 1982; 
Loomes and Sugden 1982, 1987a; Fishburn 1988) and have received 
empirical support (Loomes and Sugden 1987b; Loomes 1988). 
VI. Conclusion 
There has been much debate about the impact of judgmental errors 
in economic settings. Economists usually contend that in natural set- 
tings people either learn from personal experience or are surrounded 
by institutions-such as advice of relatives or consultants-that pro- 
vide advice in unfamiliar situations. How well people learn from per- 
sonal experience, and from the experience of others, is therefore a 
central question in the debate about the behavioral foundations of 
economics. 
Our research suggests grounds for pessimism about both kinds of 
learning. Hindsight bias narrows the gap between what occurred and 
what predictions are recalled, reducing valuable feedback and inhibit- 
16 However, contracts tying compensation to ex post performance appear to be rare 
(Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988). 
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ing learning. The curse of knowledge makes personal expertise seem 
more widely shared than it is, making it difficult for people to convey 
their expertise to others and reducing the apparent need (from the 
perspective of the better-informed individual) for such a transfer of 
knowledge. 
As with all judgment errors by individuals, the curse of knowledge 
may not persist in a competitive market. To examine the effect of the 
market we ran a series of experiments in which better-informed sub- 
jects predicted the judgments of less well informed subjects. The 
curse of knowledge suggests that informed subjects will be unable to 
ignore the information they have that the uninformed subjects lack, 
causing a bias in their predictions. We found that bias in markets was 
half as large as bias in individual judgments. Our data suggest that the 
error-correcting power of markets derives not from the feedback they 
provide, but from the disproportionate activity of more rational trad- 
ers. 
Appendix 
Instructions for Market Experiment and Experimental Materials 
General 
This is an experiment about decision making in a market. Various research 
foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are sim- 
ple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a 
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment you will buy and sell certificates in a series of market 
periods. Each period consists of two sessions, session A and session B. 
Specific Instructions 
Your market profits come from two sources-from collecting dividends on all 
certificates you hold at the end of each market session and from buying and 
selling certificates during the market session. During each session you are free 
to buy and sell as many certificates as you wish provided you follow the rules 
below. 
For each certificate you hold at the end of a session you will earn a specific 
dollar amount (a "dividend"), which will be announced at the end of each 
market period. This amount will be recorded on row 11 of the Information 
and Record Sheet [see fig. Al] for each market session. The method by which 
the dividend is determined in each period is explained later in these instruc- 
tions. 
You will calculate your total certificate earnings for a session by multiplying 
the dividend per certificate by the number of certificates held. That is, 
number of certificates held x dividend per certificate 
= total certificate earnings. 
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Trader # 
Period: DIAMOND SHAMROCK Session A 
Please Estimate the Other Group's Prediction: $.25 
(before trading begins) (circle if 
within 10%) 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Transaction Transaction Price Certificates Dollars 
Number Purchases Sales on hand on hand 
_________________________________________________________________ 
0 --------initial holdings---------- 2 $50 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1 
2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
3 
________________________________________________________________ 
4 
_________________________________________________________________. 
5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
7 
________________________________________________________________. 
8 
________________________________________________________________ 
9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
11 Dividend (Other Group's Prediction) = $ - 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Total Certificate Earnings = 
12 Dividend x Number of Certificates 
_________________________________________________________________ 
13 Total Dollars = Dollars on Hand + Row 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
14 NET PROFIT FOR SESSION A = Row 13 - $53.50 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Record this number 
on your profit sheet 
FIG. Ala.-Information and record sheet, session A 
For example, suppose that you hold three certificates at the end of session A. 
If for that session your dividend is $1.27 per certificate, then your total 
certificate earnings in the session would be 3 x $1.27, or $3.81. This number 
should be recorded on row 12 at the end of the market period. 
At the beginning of each session you are provided with an initial holding of 
certificates, which are recorded on row 0 of your Information and Record 
Sheet. You may sell these certificates if you wish, or you may hold them. If 
you hold a certificate, then you receive the dividend for each certificate you 
hold at the end of the period. 
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your dollar holdings by the 
amount of the sale price. Similarly, purchases reduce your holdings by the 
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Trader # 
Period: DIAMOND SHAMROCK Session B 
Please Estimate the Other Group's Prediction: $.25 
(before trading begins) (circle if 
within 10%) 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Transaction Transaction Price Certificates Dollars 
Number Purchases Sales on hand on hand 
_________________________________________________________________ 
0 --------initial holdings---------- 2 $50 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1_ 
2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
3 
________________________________________________________________ 
4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
7 
________________________________________________________________ 
8 
________________________________________________________________ 
9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
11 Dividend (Other Group's Prediction) = $ - 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Total Certificate Earnings = 
12 Dividend x Number of Certificates 
_________________________________________________________________ 
13 Total Dollars = Doliars on Hand + Row 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
14 NET PROFIT FOR SESSION A = Row 13 - $53.50 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Record this number 
on your profit sheet 
Please Estimate the Other Group's Prediction: $.25 
(after trading ends) (circle if 
within 10%) 
FIG. Alb.-Information and record sheet, session B 
amount of the purchase price. Thus you can gain or lose money on the pur- 
chase and resale of certificates. 
In addition to your certificates, in each session you are given an initial 
amount of dollars, which is recorded on row 0 of your Information and 
Record Sheet. You may keep these dollars if you wish or you may use them to 
purchase certificates. 
Suppose you sell all the certificates you began the session with, so that your 
holding of certificates is zero. You may continue to sell certificates by "creat- 
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ing" additional certificates. If you create and sell a certificate, you receive the 
sale price of this certificate, but you will have the dividend amount of this 
certificate deducted from your earnings at the end of the period. For ex- 
ample, suppose you created two certificates and the dividend was $1.27 per 
certificate. The sale prices of the two certificates increase your holdings of 
dollars on hand, and your total certificate dividends deducted will be 2 x 
$1.27, or $2.54. 
Your dollars on hand at the end of a period are determined by your initial 
amount of dollars on hand, by dividends earned for certificates held (or 
deducted for certificates created), and by gains and losses from purchases and 
sales of certificates. All dollars on hand at the end of each session in excess of 
the "fixed cost" of $53.50 are yours to keep. These are your profits for the 
session. 
Information about Dividends 
The dividends that the certificates earn are related to a financial report about 
an actual company, written by a financial reporting service called Value Line. 
In each market period, a different company report will be used to determine 
the dividend. We will refer to each period by the company report which 
determines the dividend for that period-for example, the Angelica Corp. 
period. 
The excerpted Value Line reports [see fig. A2] you will see show four 
things about a company: (1) the annual earnings per share of stock, for each 
period from 1970 through 1979; (2) the earnings per share for each quarter 
(three-month period), from 1977 through 1979; (3) a verbal and statistical 
description of the basic nature of the company's business, which was written 
by Value Line reporters; (4) a verbal description, written by Value Line re- 
porters in January 1980, of the company's prospects in 1980. 
On the excerpted reports that you see, you will also be told a fifth piece of 
information-the company's actual earnings per share for 1980. 
Earlier this week, we showed the excerpted Value Line report that you will 
see to a number of Wharton students, much like yourselves. The only differ- 
ence is that the students were not told the fifth piece of information, the 
company's actual 1980 earnings per share. The other group of students were 
asked to predict the actual earnings per share in 1980. Students were paid $1 
if they were within 10% of the true earnings. We calculated an average of 
their predictions for each company by adding up all their predictions and 
dividing the total by the number of predictions. We will call this average 
prediction "the other group's prediction." The other group's prediction of 
1980 earnings per share will determine the amount of dividend that 
certificates will earn. For example, suppose the average prediction of 1980 
earnings per share-by students who did not know the actual earnings-was 
$1.27. Then for each certificate you hold, you will earn a dividend of $1.27. 
For each certificate created, $1.27 will be deducted from your earnings. 
Estimating the Other Group's Prediction 
Before each trading session, you must make an estimate of the other group's 
prediction. Write these estimates on the top of your Information and Record 
Sheet. You should also make an estimate of the other group's prediction at 
the end of session B. After the market period is over, we will announce the 
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DIAMOND SHAMROCK 
Earnings per Share 
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
$.75 .57 .85 1.42 2.89 3.41 3.90 4.28 3.26 3.37 
1st quarter .72 .72 .56 
2nd quarter 1.34 .93 1.01 
3rd quarter 1.08 .62 .70 
4th quarter 1.14 .99 1.10 
BUSLSINSS: Diamond Shamrock Corp. produces Avg. '78 gas & oil production: 290 mill. cu. ft. and 8.900 
chemicals and plastics for the agricultural, bI. a day. R&D costs, 2.1 % of sales: wages, 16% '78 deprec. 
automotive, furniture, metal, and textile industries. rate: 5.8% Est'd plant age: 6 yes. Has 11,644 empls, 40,204 
Also engages in the exploration, production and stkhldrs. Insiders hold 1.6% of comm. Chrmn: CA. Cash. 
refining of crude oil and natural gas and the sale of Pres. & C.E.O.: W.it. Bricker, Inc.: Delaware. Address: 2300 
refinedpetroleumproductsandnaturalgas.Acquired Southland Center, Dallas, Texas 75201. 
Falcon Seaboard (coal producer) in 1979. 
This is an energy stock: Most of the automotive and construction industries. But wve 
company's earnings emanate from oil and expect chemical and product sales to fall off 
gas exploration, production, refining and soon. Reason: Consumer spending is on the 
marketing. We estimate that the decline, and the chemicals industry generally lags 
contribution from oil and gas will grow the economy by about 6 months. 
significantly over the next several years. The acquisition of Falcon Seaboard, Diamond's 
The refining operation, however, faces a coal mining subsidiary, is still diluting earnings. 
significant challenge. Diamond Shamrock's We estimate that Diamond's new addition 
wells don't provide nearly enough crude, reduced 1979 earnings per share by about 30c. 
particularly sweet crude, to profitably The impact should be smaller in 1980 and 
sustain operations. Previously, the company succeeding years as Falcon's profits grow. 
relied exclusively on other domestic Diamond Shamrock has excellent long-term 
suppliers.Butinanotheroilcrisis,Diamond prospects. The coal and oil and gas operations 
Shamrock could get cut short. So manage- are destined to be winners in the energy hungry 
ment is looking abroad. Eighties. The chemicals, too, should thrive as the 
Diamond Shamrock's reserves are an economns recovers. The result may well be 
important factor. We have roughly significant earnings, progress coupled with a 
calculated the company's oil and gas healthy advance in Diamond's stock price. 
reserves at $30-$32 a share. And recently A.H.S./F.B.N. 
acquired Falcon Seaboard adds a new 
stitch--an estimated $215 million (about 
54 a share) of untapped coal reserves. 
These assets make this stock look cheap. 
The recession dampens our enthusiasm. 
Thus far, demand for most of Diamond's 
chemical and plastics products has 
remained firm. Slippage has occurred only 
in goods directlv affected by the depressed 
FIG. A2.-Value Line report on Diamond Shamrock Corp. 
other group's prediction. For each of your estimates which are within 10% of 
the other group's prediction, you will earn $0.25 (twenty-five cents) in addi- 
tion to your earnings from the markets. 
Sessions within Market Periods 
In each market period there are two sessions, A and B. One company's 
excerpted Value Line report will be used for both the A and the B sessions in 
a single market period. We will only announce the other group's prediction 
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(i.e., the dividend which certificates will earn) at the end of session B, which 
also concludes the market period. 
At the end of session A you can record your holdings of dollars and 
certificates, but you cannot calculate your profits because you will not be told 
the dividend until the end of session B. Therefore, after we announce the 
dividend at the end of session B, you can return to your session A Informa- 
tion and Record Sheet and record your dividends and calculate your profits 
from session A. 
Trading and Recording Rules 
1. All transactions are for one certificate at a time. After each of your transac- 
tions you must record the transaction price, in the "purchases" column if you 
bought a certificate or in the "sales" column if you sold a certificate. Your first 
transaction in a session is recorded on row 1 of that session's Information and 
Record Sheet, your second transaction is recorded on row 2, and so on. After 
each transaction you must calculate and record your new holdings of certifi- 
cates and your new amount of dollars on hand. Your holding of dollars may 
never go below zero. 
2. If your holding of certificates goes to zero and you create certificates, the 
number of created certificates will be recorded as a negative number of 
certificates held. For instance, if you sell all your certificates, then create three 
certificates, your certificate holding will be - 3. If you buy certificates after 
creating certificates, then your purchase reduces the number of certificates 
created. If you created three certificates, so that your certificate holding is 
- 3, and you buy two certificates, then your new holding of certificates is - 3 
+ 2, or - 1. If you have created more certificates than you began with and 
bought, your amount of certificates will be negative at the end of the period, 
so your dividends (recorded in row 12) will be negative. 
3. At the end of the period, record your total certificate dividends in row 
12. At the end of the period, add dividends earned on row 12 to your dollars 
on hand, and write the total in row 13. Subtract the "fixed cost" of $53.50 
from this total, and write the difference in row 14. This is your profit for the 
market session and is yours to keep. At the end of each market period, record 
this number on your Profit Sheet. 
4. At the end of each market period, after we announce the other group's 
prediction, you can evaluate whether your estimates were within 10% of the 
other group's prediction or not. For each estimate which is within 10%, you 
earn $0.25. These earnings should also be recorded on your Profit Sheet. 
5. At the end of the experiment add up your total profit from the market 
period, and enter this sum on row P1 of your Profit Sheet. Add up your 
earnings from estimating the other group's prediction, and write this total in 
row P2. Add the profits in rows P1 and P2, and record the total in row P3. 
The experimenter will pay this amount of money in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Market Organization 
The market will be conducted in a series of periods. Each trading session will 
last 3 minutes. Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free to raise his or 
her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified price, and 
anyone who is willing to sell or create a certificate is free to accept or not 
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accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a certificate is free to raise his 
or her hand and make a verbal offer to sell one certificate at a specified price. 
If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single 
certificate, and the contracting traders will record the transaction on their 
Information and Record Sheets. Bids and offers may not be removed after 
they are recorded. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by random 
choice. There are likely to be many bids and offers that are not accepted, but 
you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
Except for the bids and offers and their acceptance, you are not to speak to 
any other subject about the experiment. 
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